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Abstract 
This study investigates the impact of foreign ownership on bank risk in Vietnam between 
2006 and 2015. Our findings show that foreign ownership can lower bank risk, suggesting 
that the State Bank of Vietnam should further remove restrictions on foreign investments in 
the banking system. The findings also indicate that higher bank risk is associated with greater 
technical efficiency, suggesting that the skimping-cost hypothesis may exist. The same 
conclusion is true for large banks, for banks with higher liquid assets, and those with greater 
loan growth. More interestingly, we do find evidence that state-owned banks with a greater 
level of foreign share are likely more stable. This is also true for the case of listed banks with 
a higher level of foreign ownership.  




Deregulation and globalization are one of the primary drivers of foreign investment in 
emerging countries. Several studies have been documented the benefits of foreign ownership 
in countries such as improving financial services and having easier access to international 
financial markets (Levine 1996); enhancing market discipline and the competition in the host 
country (Claessens & Horen 2014). These countries, however, have implemented a broad 
range of national policies to restrict the inflow of foreign capital because of the perceived 
risks from financial openness. This study attempts to examine whether foreign ownership 
improves banks’ solvency. 





There is a large volume of studies that have examined the impact of foreign ownership on 
banking risk in the host country. Empirical studies using cross-country data have shown 
mixed findings. Laeven (1999) foreign-owned banks tend to take more risk than other types 
of bank ownership in the East-Asia region. This is in line with the findings of Yeyati and 
Micco (2007) in the Latin-America. In contrast, Crystal, Dages and Goldberg (2002) suggest 
that foreign banks are more prudent than local banks in emerging markets. Besides, several 
banking studies have investigated the impact of foreign bank entry and foreign majority 
ownership on bank performance and firms’ access to bank credit (Berger et al. 2005; Lin 
2011; Unite & Sullivan 2003; Xu 2011).  
It is argued that the role of minority foreign ownership in the risk-taking behavior of a local 
bank is often ignored (Tacneng 2015). This could be the case for emerging markets where the 
foreign ownership restrictions in the banking systems exist (Barth, Caprio & Levine 2001). 
However, there is a limited number of studies that have examined the role of minority foreign 
ownership on banking performance, such as banking efficiency in China (Berger, Hasan & 
Zhou 2009), bank risk in Egypt (ElBannan 2015). This paper attempts to fill this gap by 
examining the impact of minority foreign ownership on bank risk in Vietnam.  
Vietnam has taken various steps towards the liberalization and reform of the formal financial 
sector to improve the stability and performance of the Vietnamese banking system. 
Therefore, the banking sector has experienced significant institutional and structural changes 
over the past decades. Especially, foreign banks are also allowed to take a stake in local 
banks in the form of strategic partnerships. The government, however, imposes the condition 
that the total shares of foreign investors must not exceed 30% of the charter capital of a local 
bank. Additionally, the Vietnamese government considers further increasing foreign share in 
a local bank. This offers an interesting context to examine whether foreign ownership in local 
banks would reduce bank risk. This study is the first attempt to investigate the relationship 
between foreign ownership and bank insolvency risk in Vietnam. This would help 
Vietnamese authorities to decide on whether the total share of foreign investors should be 
increased. This will also increase the external validity of the impact of foreign ownership on 
bank risk in the South-East Asia region and others where the banking system has faced 
similar foreign capital restrictions although Tacneng (2015) may be one of the few 
exceptions. 
Our findings show that foreign ownership is associated with a reduction in bank risk, 
implying that foreign banks can transfer knowledge and better managerial skills to local 





partners. Higher risk is related to greater technical efficiency, suggesting that the skimping-
cost hypothesis may exist. The same conclusion is true for larger bank size, higher liquidity, 
and greater loan growth. In general, state-owned commercial banks are more stable than 
privately owned ones. This positive link still holds when observing the joint effect of 
government ownership and foreign acquisition. A positive relationship is also found in the 
case of listed banks with a greater level of foreign ownership. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
the Vietnamese banking system. Section 3 presents the literature review. Section 4 indicates 
the methodology and data, and Section 5 discusses the empirical results while Section 6 
concludes. 
2. An overview of the Vietnamese banking system 
Since the implementation of ‘doi moi’ (Renovation Reforms) in 1986, the banking system 
transformed the one-tier into a two-tier system. The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) gradually 
shifted to more of a ‘true’ central bank and is responsible for controlling money, credit, and 
banking operation networks throughout the country to stabilize the value of money. 
Meanwhile, the SBV governs and supervises the second-tier system; the commercial banks 
include state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), privately owned commercial banks 
(POCBs), joint-venture banks (JVBs), and foreign banks (FBs). Since then, several reforms 
were introduced to transform banks into market-functioning and improving banks’ stability. 
These reforms have mainly focused on restructuring SOCBs that have long served as a 
lending arm of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The rest of the banking system, 
approximately 50% of total bank assets (KPMG 2013) has a much-diversified structure. First, 
two policy banks have proven to be efficient tools of the state in mobilizing various 
resources, both domestically and internationally, to perform designated socio-political 
lending programs. Second, POCBs are generally the most market-oriented, and their equity 
ownership is mainly distributed among state, private, and foreign investors. Third, non-
banking financial institutions (other credit institutions, investment banks, and financial 
auxiliaries) increase their contribution to the amount of credit available in the financial 
system. Last, the presence of foreign banks in the market has increased since Vietnam entered 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007. Two forms of foreign participation are 
greenfield investment and acquisitions of a minority share in the form of a strategic 
partnership. The liberalization process was further accelerated by entering the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2007, The FBs’ share of total commercial banking assets has 





remained small and stable, rising from 9.5% in 2007 to 10% in 2011 (WB 2014). The 
government, however, imposes the condition that the total shares of foreign investors must 
not exceed 30% of the charter capital of a local bank. The further increase in the share of 
foreign banks in a local bank is considered in the restructuring program that was officially 
released by the Vietnamese government in 2012. This study is the first attempt to shed a light 
on whether or not foreign ownership reduces bank insolvency risk in the Vietnamese banking 
system. 
3. Literature review 
An increase in foreign shares in the banking sector has encouraged researchers to examine the 
role of foreign ownership in the host country. The benefits and costs of foreign ownership in 
the banking sector have documented in several studies1. Foreign ownership may (1) increase 
the credit supply and improve the allocation of this credit to domestic banks (2) improve the 
quality and availability of financial services due to improved competition (3) introduce better 
skills and technology (4) enhance banks’ supervisory and legal framework (5) improve the 
access to the international capital market. Consequently, this strengthens the financial system 
(Giannetti & Ongena 2009). In particular, as being a stakeholder of local banks, foreign 
banks transfer knowledge and superior technology to local banks. Therefore, this would 
increase the competitiveness of local banks (Choi & Hasan 2005). The enhanced competition 
via the increasing entry of foreign banks may also reduce bank risk (Berger et al. 2005) and 
improve bank efficiency by reducing costs and improving profits (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt 
& Huizinga 2001). 
On the other hand, foreign banks may have lower performance than local banks. This can be 
explained by the fact that foreign banks may find it difficult to manage from a distance and 
deal with the different economic and regulatory environments (Berger et al. 2005). The 
presence of foreign banks may exert competitive pressure on domestic banks and reduce their 
franchise value or even may force them to increase their risk to address this competition 
(Hellmann, Murdock & Stiglitz 2000).  
The literature also demonstrates that bank risk is affected by the ownership structure 
(Angkinand & Wihlborg 2010; Barth, Caprio & Levine 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine & Min 
 
1 Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel (2005) provide an excellent review of the impact of foreign banks’ entry on bank 
performance and efficiency in transition countries. 





1998). There is no consensus on the impact of foreign ownership on bank risk. Several cross-
country studies indicate that foreign ownership tends to reduce financial fragility and makes 
banks less prone to the financial crisis such as Laeven (1999) in East-Asia; Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Levine and Min (1998) in the global banking system; Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) in 107 
countries. In the same view, a negative relationship between foreign ownership and bank risk 
was also found in studies in individual countries such as Choi and Hasan (2005) in Korea; 
and Chou and Lin (2011) in Taiwan; and Tacneng (2015) in the Philippines. A study by 
ElBannan (2015) in Egypt posits that foreign ownership reduces bank credit risk but 
increases insolvency risk.  
In contrast, several studies demonstrate the opposite findings. A cross-country study by 
Angkinand and Wihlborg (2010) suggests that foreign ownership is related to higher risk-
taking. A similar result has been found by Unite and Sullivan (2003) in the case of the 
Philippines. Furthermore, several studies show that foreign-owned banks are riskier than 
domestic banks such as Yeyati and Micco (2007) in Latin America; Fungáčová and Solanko 
(2009) in Russia. In the same vein, a cross-country study by De Nicolò and Loukoianova 
(2007) points out that foreign banks in non-industrialized countries bear a higher risk than 
local counterparts and this relationship depends on the country- and firm-specific 
characteristics. A study by Berger et al. (2005) demonstrates that the performance of foreign-
owned banks in Argentina is somewhat lower than their domestically-owned counterpart, but 
the differences are small in relation to the effects of state ownership.  
Because there are substantial differences in institutional reality and regulatory framework the 
experiences of one country do not necessarily reflect the true effect of foreign ownership in 
another country. By providing evidence on the relationship between foreign ownership and 
bank risk in Vietnam will strengthen the evidence of the impact of foreign ownership in 
emerging markets, especially the Asia-Pacific region. 
4. Methodology and data 
4.1 Empirical model 
The primary goal of this paper is to examine the impact of foreign ownership and bank risk in 
Vietnam. Taking into account the extant literature as well as Vietnamese banks’ 
characteristics, we consider both bank-specific and macroeconomic factors.  





One is endogeneity: as an example, banks with poor management may fail to control 
operating costs, thus leading to higher risk. Higher-risk banks are also subject to more 
regulatory scrutiny – thus they may be required to hold a greater level of liquid assets and to 
be prudent to advance new lending. The causality could also go in the opposite direction as 
banks that face greater risk are required additional managerial efforts, additional resources to 
deal with these problems, which may ultimately reduce banks’ efficiency. The ownership 
may be also endogenous as investors may choose to invest in banks with higher risk to 
maximize their expected utility (Gugler & Weigand 2003). 
Another critical issue is unobservable heterogeneity across banks, which could be very large 
in the Vietnamese case given differences in corporate governance, which cannot be well-
measured. This is further confirmed by the results shown in Table 1. Finally, the bank risk 
may be persistent for Vietnamese banks because of political interference.2 This may be the 
case for state-owned commercial banks that are targeted to have lower insolvency risk. 
We address three potential problems together by moving beyond the methodology currently 
as used in several papers on the relationship between foreign ownership and bank risk in 
emerging markets such as Tacneng (2015) in the Philippines and ElBannan (2015) in Egypt, 
mainly the pooled ordinary least square. Following prior studies such as García-Herrero, 
Gavilá and Santabárbara (2009), Lensink and Naaborg (2007), and among others, the 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) is used. 
This method accounts for endogeneity by using the lagged values of the dependent variable 
and the lagged value of other regressors which are potentially suffering from endogeneity as 
instruments. We instrument for all regressors except for those which are exogenous.3 It is 
noted that the variables treated as endogenous in our models are presented in italics in the 
tables of results below. The GMM system also controls for unobserved heterogeneity and the 
persistence of the dependent variable. All in all, this estimator yields consistent estimations of 
the parameters. The estimated coefficients are also more efficient when the use of an ampler 
set of instruments is considered. 
 
2 Apart from the efforts of bank managers, the banking reforms proposed by the State Bank of Vietnam 
generally aim to improve the banks’ stability over time. 
3 It is assumed that strictly exogenous variables do not correlate with the individual effects while the 
endogenous variables are predetermined. 





The last common challenge is the potential risk of omitted variables. Following the general to 
a specific procedure as used by García-Herrero, Gavilá and Santabárbara (2009), we estimate 
an equation with all possible regressors according to the suggestion of the extant literature 
and Vietnamese specific characteristics. Thereafter, a Wald test is run to test the joint 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the variables that are not significant individually are equal 
to zero. If not rejected, the model will be re-estimated with those control variables that show 
statistical significance in a general regression.  Otherwise, we test a less restrictive hypothesis 
but still attempt to reduce the number of non-significant regressors to the maximum extent 
possible. A reduction in the number of regressors is stopped when we can reject that the 
remaining set of coefficients of the control variables is equal to zero. By doing so, the derived 
coefficients become more efficient since the number of regressors is decreased to the 
minimum. 
In sum, along with data limitations, the system GMM is used to control for potential 
endogeneity as explained above, unobserved heterogeneity, and the persistence of the 
dependent variable, measuring bank risk. It is important to note that the nature of our sample 
with large N and small T does not allow the accurate estimation of N-invariant regressors, 
mainly macroeconomic factors. When these macroeconomic variables are replaced by time 
dummies, the results are relatively similar and available upon request. 
The above arguments suggest the application of a dynamic model that takes the following 
form:  
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼10𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
+ 𝛼11𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
When calculating bank risk, there are few measures of bank risk such as the ratio of loan loss 
provision to total loans (Williams 2004); the ratio of loan loss reserves (Altunbas et al. 2007; 
Le 2018); the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (Berger, Klapper & Turk-Ariss 
2009), one or five-year expected default frequency (Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez & Molyneux 
2011) and the Z-score (Le 2020a; Le, Nguyen & Tran 2020; Le, Tran & Nguyen 2019). The 
first three measures are subject to managerial discretion and capture only credit risks.4 The 
expected default frequency requires data on stock prices, but many Vietnamese banks do not 
hold publicly traded securities. Subsequently, Z-score as a measure of bank risk is used as a 
 
4 There is substantial missing data on non-performing loans of banks in the sample. 





dependent variable in our study. The Z-score is an inverse measure of overall bank risk. 
Additionally, equity to total assets (CAP) as a proxy for the bank’s capitalization level is also 
used for robustness checks. A larger value of Z-score implies a greater bank’s stability and 
less overall bank risk. Additionally, a higher value of CAP indicates lower bank risk.   
Following Lepetit and Strobel (2013) and Le, Tran and Nguyen (2019), a measure of Z-score 
is constructed as 
𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖 + 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
 
where 𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖, the mean of ROA over the examined period; EQUITY, the ratio of total equity 
to total assets; 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴, the standard deviation of ROA over the examined period. Because of a 
highly skewed distribution of Z-scores, the natural logarithm of Z-scores is used to reduce 
this problem. In brief, the natural logarithm of the Z-score is labeled as ‘ZSCORE’ in the rest 
of this research. 
It is important to highlight that FOR, the total share of foreign banks in the local bank as a 
proxy for the effect of foreign ownership is our main interest variable. Furthermore, dummy 
variables are also used to evaluate the static, selection, and dynamic effects of foreign 
acquisitions on bank risk. These variables are further discussed in the next section. Foreign 
banks5 may transfer high technology, better managerial skills, and a wide range of good 
financial services to local partners - thus reducing banks’ insolvency risk. Although local 
banks with foreign shareholdings have superior technical and financial resources, they may 
suffer from more severe information-asymmetry problems. These issues may arise due to the 
cultural differences between foreign and domestic shareholders. Therefore, foreign ownership 
may not improve banks’ solvency.6  
We also examine the effect of other bank ownership on bank risk-taking in Vietnam (state-
owned vs privately owned commercial banks; listed vs non-listed banks). OWNER is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for a state-owned commercial bank, and 0 otherwise. 
LISTED is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for a listed bank, and 0 otherwise. In 
Vietnam, foreign acquisition activities had undertaken either before or after listing in the 
 
5 It is important to notice the foreign stakes in local banks that are included in our sample are foreign banks. 
6 Tacneng (2015) provides a good discussion on the impact of foreign ownership on bank performance regarding 
foreign institutional or portfolio investors.  





stock market. Also, foreign banks were allowed to become strategic partners of domestic 
banks by purchasing shares up to 30% of total charter capital. Therefore, we include 
interaction terms between foreign acquisition and other bank ownership in our model to 
examine their joint effect on bank risk-taking.  
For other bank-specific characteristics, we use bank efficiency (INEF), bank size (LNTA) 
liquidity (LATA), loan growth (LOGR) while market concentration (HHI), GDP growth 
(GDP), inflation (INF), and banking reform (REF) are used to control for macroeconomic 
conditions. More specifically, INEF7, technical inefficiency as derived from the bootstrap 
Data Envelopment Analysis is used to control for bank inefficiency. LNTA, the natural 
logarithm of total assets is used to control for bank size while bank liquidity (LATA) is 
proxied by the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Similar to Le (2020a), loan growth 
(LOGR) is measured by the percentage change in the total loans from the year t-1 to year t. 
For macroeconomic factors, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Assets Index (HHI), the sum of 
squared relative market shares of total assets, is also used to provide robust checks for our 
main findings. The value of HHI ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates no concentration and 1 
denotes a fully concentrated market. GDP, the annual growth rate of GDP is used to control 
for the economic condition that may affect a bank’s investment opportunity and therefore 
bank risk-taking behavior while INF, the inflation rate is used to control for the effects of 
inflation. In the Vietnamese banking system, this experienced the restructuring program to 
enhance bank stability that was officially announced in 2012 by the government. To account 
for this effect, REF, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the restructuring period 
(2011-2015), 0 otherwise is used.  
Before selecting our model, we test for heteroscedasticity when one or more regressors are 
endogenous. Breusch and Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test is used to test the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity. We perform Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg heteroskedasticity tests χ in 
two steps. First, the equation with pooled OLS is run. Then, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg test is performed.  
 
7 INEF is measured as 1 − ?̂̂?𝐷𝐸𝐴, where ?̂̂?𝐷𝐸𝐴 is the bias-corrected efficiency score under variable returns to 
scale assumption. Berger and Humphrey (1997) also suggest that the intermediation approach is more 
appropriate for measuring bank efficiency whereas the production approach is more suitable for measuring the 
efficiency of their branches. According to the intermediation approach in which banks act as intermediaries 
between depositors and borrowers, a 3x2 set of inputs and outputs are used. Following prior studies such as Le 
(2017), inputs include fixed assets, operating expenses, and loanable funds while outputs include loans and other 
earning assets.  





Table 1 The results of the Breusch-Pagan test 
 ZSCORE AZSCORE CAP 
Chi-square (χ2) 112.54 341.58 504.19 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
The regression Chi-square (χ2) results and their p-values are indicated in Table 2 (here only 
the results of χ2 and p-values are presented8). Table 1 shows the low p-values that 
demonstrate high heteroscedasticity, suggesting that the GMM method is preferable to deal 
with this issue. 
4.2 Data  
Bank-specific information was primarily collected from annual reports of individual 
Vietnamese banks from 2006 to 2015 according to the Vietnamese accounting standards. 
Since Vietnam entered the World Trade Organisation in 2007, foreign banks have been 
allowed to acquire a certain amount of shares in the local banks. Only local banks are 
selected as they are main-active players while foreign bank affiliates and joint-venture banks 
are somewhat limited to operate in the Vietnamese markets9. Therefore, we obtain an 
unbalanced panel data of 40 banks that include five state-owned commercial banks and 35 
privately owned commercial banks. These banks together accounted for more than 80% of 
total assets in the industry. Additionally, data on macroeconomic factors were collected from 
the World Bank Indicators (WB 2017). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of variables 
used in the system GMM estimator. 
In this study, foreign ownership is also measured differently to reflect the special 
characteristics of the Vietnamese banking system. While a bank is in general considered 
foreign-owned if a foreign share is at least 50 of the capital in any local bank, such dummy 
would never have a value of 1 in the Vietnamese case because of restricted rules of foreign 
acquisition in the banking sector. Nonetheless, this does not mean that foreign ownership 
could not affect bank risk. To examine this effect, the actual foreign share in a local bank 
(FOR) is used. The mean of 0.053 suggests that foreign share accounts for 5.3% of the total 
capital of the average bank in Vietnam. This is relatively small compared to other countries, 
perhaps due to the imposition of a maximum foreign share of 30% in any local bank and the 
 
8 The full results of each equation can be provided upon request. 
9 This exclusion from the sample is necessary to ensure the homogeneity of the sample when estimating relative 
bank efficiency using the bootstrap DEA. 





recent openness of the Vietnamese banking systems since 2007. For robustness check, we 
also use a dummy variable (AFOR) which takes a value of 1 for a year when the foreign 
acquisition was undertaken. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of variables used in this study 
 Mean STD Min Max 
ZSCORE 2.968 0.623 0.995 5.483 
AZSCORE 2.956 0.659 -0.725 5.479 
CAP 0.131 0.097 0.011 0.661 
FOR 0.053 0.077 0 0.3 
AFOR 0.344 0.476 0 1 
NFOR 0.171 0.377 0 1 
SFOR 0.408 0.492 0 1 
DFOR 0.309 0.463 0 1 
INEF 0.124 0.083 0.026 0.467 
LNTA 17.458 1.483 13.012 20.59 
LATA 0.35 0.142 0.041 0.816 
LOGR 0.523 1.103 -0.407 11.317 
OWNER 0.142 0.349 0 1 
LISTED 0.182 0.386 0 1 
HHI 0.084 0.022 0.063 0.139 
GDP 0.061 0.006 0.052 0.071 
INF 0.104 0.07 -0.002 0.227 
REF 0.474 0.5 0 1 
No. Obs 345 345 345 345 
Notes: ZSCORE, the sum of mean return on assets and the ratio of total equity to total assets, divided by the 
mean standard deviation of return on assets; AZSCORE, the sum of return on assets and the ratio of total equity 
to total assets, divided by the standard deviation of return on assets; CAP, the ratio of total equity to total assets; 
FOR, the share of foreign ownership in the local bank; AFOR, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for a 
year when foreign acquisition was undertaken; NFOR, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for a bank that 
maintains foreign ownership over the entire period and 0 for all periods for all other banks; SFOR, a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 for a bank that underwent at least one foreign acquisition over the entire period, 
and equals 1 or 0 for all periods for other banks; DFOR, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 starting in the 
year following the foreign acquisition (t+1) and equals 0 prior to the bank’s acquisition and for all years for 
banks that did not undergo a foreign acquisition; INEF, technical inefficiency score of a bank as obtained from 
the bootstrap DEA; LNTA, the natural logarithm of total assets; LOGR, the percentage change in the total loans 
from the year t-1 to year t; HHI, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Assets Index; GDP, the annual growth rate of GDP; 
INF, the inflation rate; REF, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the restructuring period (2011-2015), 
and 0 otherwise. 
Following Berger et al. (2005), the static, selection and dynamic governance indicators are 
employed to examine the effects of foreign ownership. Due to the high correlation among 
these dummy variables as shown in Table 3, three types of indicators are included in our 
model separately. The static indicator, foreign-owned banks with no governance change 
(NFOR) is a dummy indicating foreign-owned banks that did not change governance over the 





entire period. This variable equals 1 for all periods for a bank that maintains foreign 
ownership and 0 for all periods for all other banks. As shown, there appears 17.1 % remained 
foreign-owned banks that had no governance change over the entire 2006-2015.  
For the selection governance indicator, the selected for foreign acquisition (SFOR) is a 
dummy indicating banks that underwent one or more foreign acquisitions over the examined 
period. It is typically owners of bank organizations that do the ‘selecting’. This selection 
variable equals 1 for all periods for a bank that had the corresponding governance change and 
0 for all periods for all other banks. As shown, the number of institutions that were selected 
for the foreign acquisition was 40.8%.  
The dynamic governance indicator dummy variable, underwent foreign acquisition (DFOR) 
indicates the years following a bank’s governance changes. A dummy equals 0 prior to the 
bank’s governance change and 1 starting in the second year following the change. Following 
common practice in the bank merger and acquisition literature, we delete the observations in 
the year following foreign acquisition to help reduce some of the short-term transitional costs 
of consummating the governance change. These may include any one-time legal expenses, 
consultant fees, and severance pay, costs of changing or integrating the management and 
banking systems, and any costs involved in climbing the learning curves to understand the 
local economic environment of the acquired institution. Each dummy equals 0 for all periods 
for banks that did not undergo foreign acquisition. The mean of the dynamic indicator is often 
less than that for the corresponding selection indicator because the dynamic indicator only 
takes a value of 1 after the governance change. As indicated, the number of institutions that 
were selected for the dynamic foreign acquisition was 30.9%.  
Regarding other bank property, there appears that the number of state-owned commercial 
banks and listed banks were on average 14.2% and 18.2%, respectively. The mean of 0.131 
suggests that total equity accounted for 13.1 % of the total assets of the average bank in 
Vietnam while the average Z-score of Vietnamese bank was 2.956. Additionally, a low 
standard deviation of bank-risk measures indicates slight volatility during the examined 
period. Other bank-specific variables indicate that the average bank inefficiency was 12.4%; 
the average ratio of liquid assets to total assets was 35.1%; the average loan growth was 
52.3% with greater volatility (i.e. a standard deviation of 1.103). Also, the average annual 





GDP growth rate and the inflation rate were 6.1% and 10.4%, respectively. The value of HHI 
was relatively low, indicating a competitive environment in the Vietnamese banking system. 
Figure 1 shows an increasing trend of foreign acquisitions (FOR) in local banks in the 
Vietnamese banking system. However, there appears an opposite phenomenon when 
observing bank capitalization (CAP) and bank stability (ZSCORE and AZSCORE) although 
they reached a peak in years the 2008-2009, respectively before deteriorating. 
 
Figure 1 The evolution of foreign share in domestic banks in Vietnam 
Notes: The figures are estimated on average each year. FOR and CAP are measured in percent. 
5. Results 
5.1 The baseline models 
The results of the relationship between foreign ownership and bank risk in Vietnam between 
2006 and 2015 are presented in Tables 2-3. To mitigate potential endogeneity with bank-level 
control variables, we follow Distinguin, Roulet and Tarazi (2013) by replacing all bank-level 
explanatory variables with their one-year lagged value in all regressions. Therefore, the one-
year lagged values of the presumably endogenous variables will be used as instruments.10  
The result of the Hansen test is also reported to investigate the validity of the dynamic panel 
model (Baltagi 2008).  Accordingly, as the p-value of the Hansen test is statistically not 
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significant in any of the models, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.11 Thus, there is no 
evidence of over-identifying restrictions. In other words, all conditions for the moments are 
satisfied and the above instruments are accepted. Moreover, the first- and second-order 
autocorrelation values are also reported between the first residual differences. In the first-
order autocorrelation (AR1), the hypothesis of the non-existence of the first-order 
autocorrelation between first residual differences is rejected. However, this does not mean 
that estimates are inconsistent. Inconsistency would be implied if the second-order 
autocorrelation is present (Arellano & Bond 1991).  The AR2 in all models shows that the 
moment conditions are satisfied since p-values are statistically not significant12. Nonetheless, 







11 Cameron and Pravin (2010) suggest that the value of the Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions should 
exceed 0.05, thus the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Alternatively, there is no correlation between the 
instrument variables and the residuals. 
12 Arellano and Bond (1991) demonstrate p-values of AR2 above 0.05 that instruments are still valid. 





Table 3 The correlation matrix of variables used 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. ZSCORE 1               
2. AZSCORE 0.987 1              
3. CAP 0.319 0.322 1             
4. FOR 0.209 0.216 0.209 1            
5. AFOR 0.173 0.177 0.223 0.952 1           
6. NFOR 0.045 0.038 0.173 0.571 0.626 1          
7. SFOR 0.164 0.163 0.241 0.832 0.873 0.547 1         
8. DFOR 0.191 0.201 0.233 0.893 0.924 0.628 0.807 1        
9. INEF 0.090 0.090 -0.049 0.131 0.105 0.142 0.087 0.078 1       
10. LNTA -0.242 -0.247 -0.711 0.263 0.300 0.165 0.312 0.320 -0.096 1      
11. LATA -0.017 -0.026 -0.047 0.076 0.023 -0.132 0.081 0.002 -0.109 -0.011 1     
12. LOGR -0.101 -0.064 -0.010 -0.049 -0.060 -0.002 -0.018 -0.067 -0.012 -0.188 0.071 1    
13. GDP 0.004 0.015 0.004 -0.059 -0.060 0.018 0.029 -0.110 -0.133 -0.168 -0.004 0.243 1   
14. INF 0.084 0.093 0.127 -0.060 -0.039 -0.023 -0.021 -0.071 0.043 -0.196 0.131 -0.122 -0.081 1  
15. HHI 0.129 0.150 0.180 -0.127 -0.122 0.023 0.036 -0.183 0.131 -0.432 -0.035 0.230 0.525 -0.008 1 
Notes: ZSCORE, the sum of mean return on assets and the ratio of total equity to total assets, divided by the mean standard deviation of return on assets; AZSCORE, the sum 
of return on assets and the ratio of total equity to total assets, divided by the standard deviation of return on assets; CAP, the ratio of total equity to total assets; FOR, the share 
of foreign ownership in the local bank; AFOR, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for a year when foreign acquisition was undertaken; NFOR, a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 for a bank that maintains foreign ownership over the entire period and 0 for all periods for all other banks; SFOR, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 
for a bank that underwent at least one foreign acquisition over the entire period, and equals 1 or 0 for all periods for other banks; DFOR, a dummy variable that takes a value 
of 1 starting in the year following the foreign acquisition (t+1) and equals 0 prior to the bank’s acquisition and for all years for banks that did not undergo a foreign 
acquisition; INEF, technical inefficiency score of a bank as obtained from the bootstrap DEA; LNTA, the natural logarithm of total assets; LOGR, the percentage change in 
the total loans from the year t-1 to year t; GDP, the annual economic growth rate; INF, the inflation rate; HHI, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Assets Index. 
 





Table 4 The relationship between foreign ownership and bank risk 

















      




    
NFOR    0.999*** 
(0.289) 
   



















































































































































AFOR*OWNER   0.569** 
(0.267) 
    
AFOR*LISTED   -0.412 
(0.39) 
    
SFOR*OWNER      0.679 
(1.584) 
 

















No. Obs 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 
No. Groups 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.769 0.757 0.845 0.523 0.508 0.456 0.484 
AR1 (p-value) 0.003 0.005 0.011 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 
AR2 (p-value) 0.151 0.170 0.697 0.405 0.144 0.225 0.327 
F-test 124.18*** 146.82*** 44.28*** 75.24*** 49.45*** 27.87*** 455.58*** 
Notes: We only report the results of interaction terms among bank governance indicators that show statistical 
significance. The table contains the results estimated using the system GMM estimator. Variables in italics are 
instrumented through the GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995). Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. *, **, ***Significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 





The data in Table 4 shows that the coefficients of foreign ownership measures are generally 
positive and significant in most of all models,13 suggesting that foreign ownership can reduce 
bank risk. In other words, foreign banks can transfer knowledge and better managerial skills 
to local partners. This is in line with those by ElBannan (2015) in Egypt; Tacneng (2015) in 
the Philippines. In the case of the Vietnamese banking system, Le (2020b) emphasizes that 
foreign-owned banks may have an advantage of paying lower interest rates than their local 
counterparts as they are considered less risky, possibly due to their diversified loan portfolio. 
Also, Le (2021) further demonstrates that foreign ownership can improve bank stability when 
pursuing geographic expansion and income diversification. When observing other bank 
ownership, OWNER is in general positively associated with ZSCORE, suggesting that POCBs 
are less stable than SOCBs. Due to the advantage of government ownership, they are often 
perceived as safe banks. Therefore, they are allowed to pay their depositors lower interest 
rates, which in turn improving their profitability and reducing their risk (Le, Tran & Nguyen 
2019).  This positive link is the same when observing the joint effect of foreign ownership 
(AFOR) and government ownership (OWNER). This further supports foreign acquisition 
activities in state-owned banks.  
Although no evidence that listed banks (LISTED) are more stable than non-listed ones, this 
relationship becomes positive when taking into account the effect of foreign ownership 
(SFOR*LISTED). This further encourages banks to be listed in the Vietnamese stock market 
together with further foreign acquisition activities. Therefore, this would help the Vietnamese 
banking system become more transparent. 
For bank-specific characteristics, INEF is positively and significantly associated with 
ZSCORE in all versions, thus supporting the skimping costs hypothesis. This is in line with 
those by Le (2018) who suggests that banks tend to skimp on operating costs by reducing 
credit monitoring, collateral valuing, and market activities to achieve short-run economic 
efficiency. These activities, however, would deteriorate loan quality, thus resulting in a 
higher risk. The negative impact of LNTA on ZSCORE indicates that large banks have more 
incentives to invest more in risky assets because of the too-big-to-fail effects. This finding is 
comparable with those of Le (2021). The coefficient of LATA is negative and significant in all 
models, suggesting that liquid banks are more risk-taking. This can be explained by the fact 
 
13 The coefficients of DFOR in all models are statistically not significant. This interpretation should be cautious 
because of small observations on this dummy variable. 





that banks with a higher level of liquid assets will not be profitable since liquid assets do not 
generate a high yield. Consequently, they may face greater risk (Delis & Staikouras 2011). 
Furthermore, a negative relationship between LOGR and ZSCORE argues that excessive 
lending results in higher bank risk. The accelerating pace of lending between 2007 and 2011, 
especially advancing to non-deposit sources, potentially exposed the Vietnamese banking 
sector to higher liquidity risk. This result supports the earlier findings of Le (2018) who 
found that significant credit expansions do not generate corresponding increases in bank 
safety margins. 
Lastly, Table 4 indicates that the coefficients of macroeconomic factors are statistically not 
significant except for INF, suggesting there is no evidence that bank risk in Vietnam is 
affected by macroeconomic conditions. A positive relationship between INF and ZSCORE 
suggests that inflation may be fully anticipated and Vietnamese banks may adjust their 
interest rate accurately. Therefore, banks may generate greater profitability and improve their 
stability. 
5.2 Robustness checks 
We run several robustness checks on our main models and for the ease of interpretation, our 
main interest variables regarding bank property are only focused on. It may be argued the 
lack of consistent evidence on the relationship between foreign ownership and bank risk 
depends upon the measures that are used for bank risk (Boyd & De Nicolo 2005). Hence, we 
use different measures of bank risk: an alternative measure of Z-score and bank 
capitalization14. Following Laeven and Levine (2009), Fu, Lin and Molyneux (2015), and 
Cihák and Hesse (2007) and Le, Tran and Nguyen (2019) the Z-score of a bank is measured 
as 




where ROA, return on assets; EQUITY, the ratio of total equity to total assets; 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴, the 
standard deviation of ROA that is calculated based on the observations of ROA over the 
examined period.  
 
14 We also use and the ratio of loan loss reverse to total assets to control for credit risk (Le 2018). The 
coefficients of foreign ownership measures are generally negative but statistically not significant, thus our main 
findings are robust.  





Table 5 The impact of foreign ownership on the bank risk using an alternative measure 
















      
AFOR  0.215** 
(0.087) 
     
NFOR   1.358*** 
0.225) 
    











































































































































SFOR*OWNER     2.348* 
(1.277) 
  
















No. Obs 305 305 305 305 305 305  
No. Groups 41 41 41 41 41 41  
Hansen test (p-value) 0.587 0.619 0.577 0.630 0.573 0.419  
AR1 (p-value) 0.144 0.144 0.137 0.096 0.123 0.128  
AR2 (p-value) 0.345 0.312 0.605 0.907 0.343 0.206  
F-test 30.54*** 28.82*** 68.35*** 56.42*** 612.90*** 26.13***  
Notes: We only report the results of interaction terms among bank governance indicators that show statistical 
significance. The table contains the results estimated using the system GMM estimator. Variables in italics are 
instrumented through the GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995). Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. *, **, ***Significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 





Table 6 The impact of foreign ownership on bank capitalization 

















    
AFOR   0.033*** 
(0.006) 
   
NFOR    0.046* 
(0.024) 
  
SFOR     0.048** 
(0.023) 
 


























































































































FOR*OWNER  0.618** 
(0.255) 
    
FOR*LISTED  -0.135 
(0.164) 













No. Obs 305 305 305 305 305 305 
No. Groups 41 41 41 41 41 41 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.724 0.724 0.734 0.656 0.409 0.484 
AR1 (p-value) 0.022 0.024 0.021 0.016 0.006 0.018 
AR2 (p-value) 0.117 0.131 0.093 0.06 0.078 0.076 
F-test 108.2*** 185.53*** 68.35*** 31.34*** 56.57*** 51.70*** 
Notes: We only report the results of interaction terms among bank governance indicators that show statistical 
significance. The table contains the results estimated using the system GMM estimator. Variables in italics are 
instrumented through the GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995). Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. *, **, ***Significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Table 5 shows the coefficients of foreign ownership measures are generally positive. When 
observing the interaction terms, the joint effect of foreign acquisition and government 





ownership on bank stability is still positive. The same results are true to the case of the 
banking capitalization level as a dependent variable as indicated in Table 6. Nonetheless, our 
main findings as above are confirmed. 
6. Conclusion 
This study investigated the impact of foreign ownership on bank risk between 2006 and 2015 
in Vietnam. Our findings show that foreign ownership is associated with a reduction in bank 
risk, suggesting that further removal of restrictions on foreign investments in the banking 
system should be considered. The findings also indicate that higher bank risk is related to 
greater technical efficiency, suggesting that supervisors must pay special attention to the 
bank’s internal credit control procedures (i.e. loan monitoring and review, collateral valuing). 
The same finding is true for large banks, for banks with higher liquid assets, and banks with 
greater loan growth. Furthermore, state-owned banks are generally more stable than privately 
owned ones. The greater stability is more associated with either state-owned banks or listed 
banks with a higher level of foreign acquisition. Along with further promoting foreign 
acquisition in the banking system, banks should be encouraged to list in the stock market in 
order to enhance transparency. 
This study may suffer the following limitation. Our research only studies one country within 
a limited period, suggesting that future research needs to examine the relationship between 
foreign ownership and bank performance in other emerging markets, especially the Asia-
Pacific region that have an analogous banking structure for robust checks. 
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